Everyone said that the economic downturn impacted their philanthropic work in a variety of ways.  Sometimes, it simply moved-up or slowed-down the time frame for initiatives they were already planning, but sometimes, it was clearly the impetus for changes in direction or ways of working.  Here is what I learned:  Strategy and Frameworks — Strategies and theories of change have been prevalent in the field for a very long time.  In the past, grantmakers often looked to non-profits and NGOs as the experts on issues and communities.  I heard from many grantmakers at staffed foundations who came from non-profits or NGOs that the role of NGOs in strategy development was changing.  This shift started before the economic downturn, but has gained momentum since then.  These grantmakers shared that they were hired for their “expertise” and as experts they were expected to develop the right strategies on issues and communities.  While many still consulted grantees or non-profits, it was more about testing their own ideas or assessing the capabilities and capacity of non-profits and NGOs to implement the foundation’s strategies.  Moreover, if staff had a question or wanted advice from experts, it was easy to pick up the phone or convene meetings or advisory councils with non-profits or academics, no need to hire outside consultants.  I asked several non-profit leaders about this and they concurred that at times they felt more like “sub-contractors” instead of partners in the work.  These non-profit leaders were also quick to point out that there was an up-side, the need to both understand and demonstrate why and how their strategies work.  But, they also wondered if the experience of non-profits was being under-valued and lack of candor unnoticed.  While most grantmakers saw no need to hire subject-matter experts, many did hire outside consultants to facilitate internal strategic planning processes.

Measurement and Evaluation — Most said there was an increased focus on measurement and evaluation to prove they were making progress and getting results.  They also said they felt the need to do more than simply count how many people had participated in programs or they reached but try to assess the impact of their grantmaking.  Many had definitional questions and others raised questions about approaches.  For example, some thought measurement and evaluation should not be imposed on grantees but developed collaboratively to promote learning and grant amounts increased to ensure meaningful participation.  Others suggested that measurement and evaluation should be used to support public and private partnerships and other collaborative efforts to learn more about the power of collaboration.  Bottom line, for almost all this was an area for which they are hiring outside experts or strengthening this expertise in-house.

Power of Collaboration — Many funders were either interested in or were participating in different types of donor collaboratives or public and private partnerships.  Almost everyone spoke about the amount of time and effort it took to identify the right set of partners and agree upon roles, expectations and desired outcomes.  For many, this was seen as an essential way of working as a result of the economic crisis and the only way to try and solve complex societal issues.  Many said they saw the need t hire outside consultants or even a team of consultants to guide such processes in an objective and independent way.

Marketplace as a Source of Social Innovation — Since the economic downturn, there was renewed interest in understanding how the marketplace could be a source of social innovation and for scaling viable ideas.  Most thought the best examples were happening outside the U.S., for example social impact bonds in the U.K.  Others cited the success of micro-businesses or social entrepreneurs throughout many countries in the developing world.  This seemed to be an area where outside expertise was seen as a value-add.  Some hired outside consultants with business experience as part of capacity-building or to understand how to scale social-purpose businesses.  Others hired experts involved in implementing or evaluating social innovation experiments for advice on expanding these models in other parts of the world.  For others, they were interested in participating in collaborative or public-private partnerships in this area and saw a role for outside consultants to support such initiatives.

Less Flexibility — Some said they had less flexibility due to frozen or reduced grants budgets or because leadership was uncertain about the future.  I also heard about examples of less independence in decision-making about grants or retaining consultants, more scrutiny than in the past.  Sometimes the scrutiny was welcome, an opportunity to engage more with colleagues about their work.  But, it also created uncertainty about the “new normal,” what discretion did they have and what were the rules.  Some sectors seemed to have little or no discretion to hire outside consultants since the economic downturn, for example, corporate giving departments or corporate foundations.

In late September 2010, I received a late night email from a colleague stating that she really needed me to help her with our Fair Trade Certified mango program. Obviously, I was filled with excitement, mixed with trepidation about this opportunity.  One week later, I was on an airplane descending into Port-au-Prince gawking through my jetlagged haze at the ramshackle, makeshift tents crowding the airport from every angle.  Welcome to Haiti and to the most unforgettable experience and people of my life.

I initially came to Haiti to provide institutional support to the umbrella organization FENAPCOM, the only Fair Trade Certified mango cooperative in Haiti, and to FENAPCOM’s 10 member associations located from the central plateau to the northern mountains of Gros Morne and back to the river valleys of the Artibonite.  My mission was clear; help these groups regain their Fair Trade certification.  How I was going to accomplish this was to be ironed out while driving Haiti’s bumpy back roads, but why it was important was evident.  In the 2010 harvest season, mango growers selling on Fair Trade terms were earning nearly double what the local market traders were paying for the same quantity of mangoes.  Each farmer I spoke to glinted with joy when they explained the importance of the “second payment” they received from the Fair Trade premium they earned in December, long after the end of the harvest, and at the exact moment when their families needed it the most.  I spent the better part of two weeks in the mountainous interior with the farmers, board members and the hired staff of the 10 organizations conducting trainings in simple democracy; namely, how to make group decisions and properly document them.  I worked with these organizations on their skill-building to create environmental plans and needs assessments.  Together, we ensured that all conventions for upholding the integrity of their organizations were being followed.  We discussed challenging topics like child labor, discrimination, and the usage of chemical fertilizers and environmental degradation.  I traversed dry river beds that suddenly flooded with water and rain and heard harrowing stories of survival, subsistence living, and the constant strugle of providing for their families and consistently bringing good quality mangoes to market while overcoming the barriers of poor or failed infrastructure.  I was taught new lessons in what was possible through training on old lessons in supply chain management.  Every day that I stood in the fields with mango farmers listening and responding to their needs I was re-energized by the cause of ensuring farmers receive proper, or “fair” pay for their incredibly hard work.

What I found from this Fair Trade mission, and a second one that I completed in December, was something very profound.  The destruction from the Earthquake is still palpable; we all know the statistics.  The threat of an even more widespread cholera outbreak is knocking on the door.  The political instability threatens to drive the country into further despair and uncertainty.  But through it all, the potential and the hope resonating within this small population of Fair Trade mango farmers, roughly 2,000 of them, is incredibly uplifting and inspiring.

From 3,000 miles away I still am overcome by what I saw there.  But for the farmers and the people living it, the Fair Trade program and the actual increase in revenues that they see from participating — in addition to the important structure that the Fair Trade standards instill — like democracy, participation, transparency, empowerment, environmental protection, and equal opportunity is providing each farmer an avenue to rebuild their own future for themselves.  I told every farmer I met, “I am not a project; I will not leave you in one to three years.  Instead, I am an opportunity.  I am an opportunity for you to tell your story to the consumers of North America.  I am your agent in the market.  I am here to give you the tools to have access to better markets, greater opportunity, and you have the keys.”

Fair Trade Certified is an opportunity for the mango growers of Haiti to lift themselves out of poverty a dozen mangoes at a time.  Please watch for the mangoes of FENAPCOM to be on the shelves of your local supermarket this spring.

Ben Schmerler is the Coffee Category and Producer Services Manager for Fair Trade USA, formerly called TransFair USA.  Fair Trade USA certifies and stamps products that are imported into U.S. markets, monitoring fair wages, working conditions, democratic decision-making structures, progress towards environmental safety and sustainability, and the circulation of the Fair Trade “social premium” as investments in community projects or to build production capacity.

In the face of these daunting needs, recent reports document that disbursal by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and payment on pledges has been slow. Oxfam cites U.N. figures showing that less than 45 percent of the $2.1 billion pledged for Haiti’s reconstruction during 2010 at an international donor conference had been disbursed. A survey of 60 U.S. charities by The Chronicle of Philanthropy shows that less than 40 percent of the nearly $1.5 billion they raised has been spent.  In March, the international community pledged $12 billion with $2 billion slated for 2010, but only $1.3 billion has been paid and much of it in recent weeks.

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.  While lack of infrastructure and grinding poverty make it much more difficult to respond to the earthquake, these factors do not explain fully why it has been so difficult to disburse charitable donations more efficiently.  Several news reports have focused on government corruption, lack of coordination, breakdown of a fledgling economy and other factors to explain why there has been so little progress.  However, one article in the Wall Street Journal raises some interesting questions about the role of NGOs in Haiti.  (WSJ, DeCordoba, Jose, Aid Spawns Backlash in Haiti, 11/12/10).

Haiti is estimated to have more aid groups per capita than any nation, perhaps as many as 10,000 according to the World Bank.  Before the earthquake ever hit, Haiti was a country where aid organizations delivered four-fifths of social services.  Paul Farmer, founder of Partners in Health, an NGO, in conjunction with the Ministry of Health, is the country’s largest health care provider.  In the Wall Street Journal article, he was quoted as observing, “NGOs have flourished in number and size as the public sector has withered in Haiti.”

Since the earthquake, the role of NGOs has only increased.  Due to concerns about corruption in Haiti’s government, most of the donations are being handled by international agencies like the United Nations and NGOs rather than Haiti’s government.  Transparency International ranks Haiti 146 out of 178 countries in its Corruption Perception Index.  “To continuously reduce us to being corrupt and inefficient means that nothing is going to work,” Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive said recently.  (WSJ, Arnesen, Ingrid, In Haiti, Hope Is the Last Thing Lost, 1/12/11)

Donors are facing a Catch-22, legitimately reticent to fund the government due to widespread corruption yet continuing to funnel funds to NGOs who for the most part report to boards and funders far from Haiti.  A prime example of this quagmire is the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) set up in April last year.  It was supposed to improve coordination of international aid projects, build state capacity for their implementation and bring donors and government actors together to lead reconstruction.  It is chaired by former President Clinton and Haiti’s Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive.   According to Oxfam, “So far, the commission has failed to live up to its mandate.”  It has only met a few times since it was formed and has not communicated its role and decisions to the Haitian people nor has it improved coordination.  Robert Fatton, a Haiti expert at the University of Virginia observed, “It’s sheer chaos.  Nobody knows who is in charge of anything.”  (WSJ, 1/12/11)

The lack of local accountability, local hiring and locally-based NGOs may be justified in an emergency, but longer-term this bodes poorly for recovery in Haiti.  The growth of a parallel NGO state with more resources than the government raises thorny questions about working in countries plagued by governmental corruption, lack of transparency or militarism.   And, what about the private sector?   Does it matter that foreign-based companies and investors are leading the growth strategies?   How can more local accountability be created?   How can NGOs move beyond the focus on immediate needs to address larger questions being raised by their very presence?   How can we raise such issues without undermining the good work being doing on the ground by thousands of well-meaning professionals and volunteers?

Today, the rats have earned the name HeroRATs. They are fully deployed in Mozambique and increasing their social impact on a daily basis: this month two million square meters of suspected land mines were returned to tens of thousands of people. The rats found over 1,030 landmines, 539 unexploded ordinances, and 10,134 small arms and ammunition.

They are planning to replicate the use of HeroRats in Angola, the most landmine affected country in sub-Saharan Africa. They also hope to bring their technology to South East Asia, in particular, Thailand in the near future.

They have moved beyond landmines to detecting Tuberculosis (TB). APOPO has begun the same way through a three-year research plan to investigate and develop this low-tech diagnostic approach. To date, the TB HeroRATs have diagnosed over 1,500 patients in Tanzania that were initially missed by means of microscopy. More importantly, this diagnostic method has increased the TB case detection rates in partner clinics by 31 percent.

They use metrics to track the progress of their work. Their most recent annual report documents that sometimes low-tech may be both more creative and effective.

• Mission creep doesn’t equal scale.
• Business model needs to start-out not just focusing on investment requirements or capital but also on the social or environmental goals.
• Need specific management expertise, peers with knowledge across specialized organizations to assess alternatives, and disciplined failure to get to scale.
• Expand market reach by developing feedback, learning tools and market segmentation models.
• Think in terms of ecosystems, not just scaling.
• Scaling through public policy is risky if the model is complex because the political process is about compromise.
• Foundations can be fickle, abandoning projects if scaling takes too long in favor of new innovations.
• Patient capital is hard to find.